【 第1页 第2页 第3页 第4页 第5页 第6页 第7页 第8页 第9页 第10页 】

中评月刊：美对华海上商业竞争分析

http://www.CRNTT.com   2025-10-16 00:24:27

注释： 　　〔1〕Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro，Delivers Remarks at Harvard Kennedy School，26 September 2023，https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3538420/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-harvard-kennedy-school/. 　　〔2〕Federal Maritime Commission，Order of Investigation into Transit Constraints at International Maritime Chokepoints，https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-04042.pdf. 　　〔3〕American Consortium’s Purchase of Hong Kong-Owned Port Terminals Has Implications Far Beyond Panama，https://rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/IP25026.pdf. 　　〔4〕Section 301Investigation Report on China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominanc，January 16，2025，https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/USTRReportChinaTargetingMaritime.pdf. 　　〔5〕本次行动设定了180天的期限，服务费将分两个阶段实施：前180天的适用费用为0美元。180天后：第一阶段：根据美国每次航行的净吨位向中国船舶所有者和经营者收取费用，并在随后的几年内逐步增加；根据净吨位或集装箱数量向中国建造船舶的运营商收取费用，并在接下来的几年中逐步增加；为了激励美国建造的汽车运输船，将根据外国建造的汽车运输船的容量收取费用。第二阶段行动三年内不会发生：为了激励美国建造的液化天然气（LNG）船舶，限制通过外国船舶运输LNG。 　　〔6〕Bipartisan SHIPS Act Aims to Counter China’s Maritime Dominance with 250-Ship Fleet Expansion，April 30, 2025，https://gcaptain.com/bipartisan-ships-act-aims-to-counter-chinas-maritime-dominance-with-250-ship-fleet-expansion/. 　　〔7〕自该命令发布之日起210天内，美国总统国家安全事务助理应与国务卿、国防部长、商务部长、劳工部长、交通部长、国土安全部长、美国贸易代表以及总统国家安全事务助理认为适当的行政部门和机构（机构） 负责人协调，通过机构和管理和预算办公室主任向总统提交海事行动计划，以实现该命令中规定的政策。 　　〔8〕Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Trump’s Executive Order to Restore U.S. Maritime Dominance，April 9, 2025,https://gcaptain.com/trump-signs-executive-order-to-revitalize-u-s-shipbuilding-amid-chinas-maritime-dominance/. 　　〔9〕Revitalised SHIPS for America Act tied to USTR China vessel fees，Barry Parker, May 1,2025 https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/revitalised-ships-for-america-act-tied-to-ustr-china-vessel-fees. 　　〔10〕Brent Sadler，Ensuring America’s Maritime Security，June 4, 2024，https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/ensuring-americas-maritime-security。 　　〔11〕澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国领导人发表《威尔明顿宣言联合声明》，2024年9月21日，https://2021-2025.state.gov/translations/chinese/the-wilmington-declaration-joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-australia-india-japan-and-the-united-states-zh/。 　　〔12〕王旭：《美西方的港口对冲计划》，《瞭望》2024年第23期。 　　〔13〕G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity，March 14, 2025，https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html. 　　〔14〕RESTORING AMERICA’S MARITIME DOMINANCE，April 9, 2025，https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/restoring-americas-maritime-dominance/. 　　〔15〕Labor unions call on Trump to boost US shipbuilding against increasing Chinese dominance，February 20, 2025，https://apnews.com/article/trump-shipbuilding-labor-unions-china-tariffs-9d55363e6b8afff3d9cda971fc692cfd. 　　〔16〕Iris Deng, “What China is doing to make ports ‘smart’ and not prone to work stoppages,”South China Morning Post，November 11, 2024,https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3285840/what-china-doing-make-ports-smart-and-not-prone-work-stoppages. 　　〔17〕Joint-Homeland-China-Select-Port-Security-Report，https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Joint-Homeland-China-Select-Port-Security-Report.pdf. 　　〔18〕Liner shipping connectivity index, quarterlyLast updated 12 Dec. 2024，https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.LSCI. 　　〔19〕Statement before the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security，February 11, 2025,https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-02/ts250211_Berg_Port_Investments.pdf?VersionId=1ls0ZK2aUnoFyOHjjpKBtXwfQIRGTdGf. 　　〔20〕Are Chinese Ports in Latin America Preferred by Organized Crime?September 23, 2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-chinese-ports-latin-america-preferred-organized-crime；The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas，September 23, 2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-port-security-americas. 　　〔21〕Responding to China’s Growing Influence in Ports of the Global South， October 30，2024，https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-chinas-growing-influence-ports-global-south. 　　〔22〕Isaac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert，Pier CompetitorChina’s Power Position in Global Ports，International Security，Vol.46，No.4，2022. 　　〔23〕America’s Maritime Blind Spot: How China is Gaining the Upper Hand on the High Seas Posted，March 5, 2025，https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/americas-maritime-blind-spot-how-china-gaining-upper-hand-high-seas. 　　〔24〕Management of Panama Canal ports by Hong Kong firm poses risks, US House panel hears，17 May 2024，https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3262984/management-panama-canal-ports-hong-kong-firm-poses-risks-us-house-panel-hears. 　　〔25〕US port fee proposals to have little effect on China amid healthy bulk ship orders，April 30, 2025，https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/us-port-fee-proposals-to-have-little-effect-on-china-amid-healthy-bulk-ship-orders/. 　　〔26〕Import Cargo Levels to See First Year-Over-Year Drop Since 2023 as Impact of Tariffs Increases,May 9, 2025，https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/import-cargo-levels-to-see-first-year-over-year-drop-since-2023-as-impact-of-tariffs-increases. 　　〔27〕LNG companies say they cannot comply with Trump rules on Chinese ships，April 27 2025，https://www.ft.com/content/bc632c27-b598-402d-b3bf-b0b87eda528e. 　　〔28〕2022 Annual Report to Congress，November 2022，https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/2022_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 　　〔29〕Thinking Through Protracted War with China Nine Scenarios，Feb 26, 2025，https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1475-1.html. 　　（全文刊载于《中国评论》月刊2025年9月号，总第333期，P12-19）

【 第1页 第2页 第3页 第4页 第5页 第6页 第7页 第8页 第9页 第10页 】