三、“博弈边界”的缺失与中美关系的未来
综合而言，拜登政府虽以“竞合”框架统领美国对华战略，但在全面对华施压思维的预设下，竞争成为主调，合作相对乏力。这也导致中美两国难以对特朗普政府时期双边关系中的分歧领域进行修复和调整。这种分歧在经贸科技领域体现得尤为明显，在双边存在争议的领域以及地区安全问题上的博弈仍在持续。与此同时，中美战略竞争中的意识形态因素进一步增加，中美关系的软环境不容乐观。
在美国政府与国会的遏压惯性下，中美关系的“缓冲区”越来越小，摩擦的烈度逐步增加，甚至出现爆发冲突乃至战争的可能性。尽管中美元首会晤为双边关系缓和奠定了重要契机，但“气球事件”后布林肯取消访华议程，中美之间的沟通渠道仅限在慕尼黑的非正式交谈，双方仅余重复强调己方立场、难以撼动对方立场。在短期内，中美关系再难以发生质的改变，双方在各个领域的斗争对峙将持续强化，幷为双边关系带来难以预估的风险。
尽管拜登政府承诺不打“新冷战”，但两国政界和学界仍对于缺乏有效管控的中美关系的发展感到担忧。2021年11月11日，美国国家安全顾问沙利文在澳大利亚智库洛伊国际政策研究所（Lowy Institute）举办的线上论坛中指出，美国一直都是“印太常驻大国”，但他也再度重申了“中美共存”的观点，认为中美两国拥有合作空间，“激烈竞争幷非一定会酿成冲突”。〔21〕但对于中美如何开展合作、合作的模式和限度是什么等问题，拜登政策团队至今未给出明确的答案。
正如美国战略与国际研究中心高级研究员白明（Jude Blancette）所述，“避免灾难是对棘手的中美关系真正的考验”〔22〕。中美之间的“稳定舵”和“安全阀”迟迟难以建立，“博弈边界”极度模糊，意味着双方将在未来的互动中时常面对超出预期和掌控的局势。目前看来，拜登治下的美国短期内仍难以克服陷入分裂和彼此攻讦的国内政治，而反中情绪则是两党极少数的共同点之一，这也决定了“对华强硬”的政治戏码会在华盛顿内部轮番上映。受制于共和党和右翼势力的压力，拜登政府继续顺应着既有的战略惯性。“气球事件”里美国各方力量争先对华“秀肌肉”幷将拜登政府步步推向强势遏压，即是这一状态的集中写照。
两国之间的互动为双方矛盾和争端所主导，中美之间的战略竞争将朝向“常态化”发展。考虑到中美两国在双边、地区和全球层面均存在许多共同利益，这种趋势不仅不符合两国利益，而且也将会为国际社会带来风险及不确定性。在用以支撑双边关系发展以及分歧管控的政策框架难以重新建立的背景下，中美关系的重构与发展将面临更大的挑战。
注释：
〔1〕The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
〔2〕The White House, “Interim National Security Strategy Guidance,” March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
〔3〕Vivian Salama and Gordon Lubold, “Biden Says He Sees China as ‘Stiff Competition’,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/biden-press-conference-live-updates-analysis/card/ifirn5yjOObkp0pm2Lzv.
〔4〕The White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/21/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-76th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/.
〔5〕U.S. Department of State, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
〔6〕U.S. Department of State, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” July 26, 2021, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
〔7〕The White House, “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Politburo Member Yang Jiechi,” October 6, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/06/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-politburo-member-yang-jiechi/.
〔8〕U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
〔9〕The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
〔10〕The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
〔11〕U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
〔12〕U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/.
〔13〕樊吉社：《美国对华决策:机制调整与团队转换》，载《当代美国评论》2021年第4期，第14-18页。
〔14〕中华人民共和国外交部，“习近平同美国总统拜登在巴厘岛举行会晤”，2022年11月14日，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202211/t20221114_10974651.shtml.
〔15〕U.S. Department of State, “New Guidelines for U.S. Government Interactions with Taiwan Counterparts,” April 9, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-guidelines-for-u-s-government-interactions-with-taiwan-counterparts/.
〔16〕“President Biden on Taiwan,” CBS, September 18, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/video/president-biden-on-taiwan-60-minutes/#x.
〔17〕Craig Singleton, “How Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Gambit Backfired,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/taiwan-pelosi-china-military-conflict-east-asia-missiles/.
〔18〕“Senator Markey Leads Bipartisan Delegation to Taiwan, Reaffirms Importance of Peace and Partnership,” August 15, 2022, https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-leads-bipartisan-delegation-to-taiwan-reaffirmsimportance-of-peace-and-partnership.
〔19〕U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2023,” https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-in-the-national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa-2023/.
〔20〕The White House, “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.
〔21〕Jake Sullivan, “2021 Lowy Lecture,” Lowy Institute, November 11, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2021-lowy-lecture-jake-sullivan.
〔22〕Jude Blanchette, “Avoiding catastrophe will be the true test of fractious US-China relations,” Financial Times, February 11, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/f794b181-b774-40d4-a763-5f41024d9afe.
（全文刊载于《中国评论》月刊2023年4月号，总第304期） |
